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THE "COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES"
EXPLANATION FOR INTRABRAND
RESTRAINTS: AN ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS
. PETER

M.

GERHART*

Four years ago, the Supreme Court fundamentally altered antitrust jurisprudence when it decided, in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc. , 1 that nonprice vertical restrictions 2 should be judged
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law. B.A. 1967,
Northwestern University; J.D. 1971, Columbia University.
I. 433 U.S. 36 {1977). The Sylvania opinion is the leading case among those of the Burger
Court that signal a pragmatic, economics-oriented antitrust policy. See also Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610
(1977); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
2. A vertical restriction is one imposed from one level of trade to another, typically by a
manufacturer on his retail dealers. A nonprice vertical restriction imposes some restraint on dealers other than on their ability to set retail prices. Nonprice restrictions include requirements that
dealers sell only in certain territories ("territorial restrictions"), or to certain customers ("customer
restrictions"), or for only certain uses ("use restrictions"), or from specified locations ("location
restrictions"). Sylvania was a case of location restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on his dealers, restrictions held to be lawful except when shown to have an anticompetitive effect. 433 U.S. at
59. A manufacturer might also assign a dealer an "area of primary responsibility," outside of
which the dealer could sell only when the sales within the primary area were adequate. Profit
pass-over contracts are similar, but require a dealer selling outside his assigned area to pay some
portion of his profits to the dealer in whose area he has sold. Restrictions can also be imposed on
a manufacturer by contract with his dealers. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MoNoGRAPH No.2: VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 3-5 (1977). Because all such restraints affect competition between sellers of the same brand of product, they are
termed "intrabrand restraints" or "intraband restrictions." Intrabrand restraints may also be imposed "hoiizontally"~for example, when competing dealers agree to fix the price of a particular
product, or when competitors form a joint venture to establish and sell a brand with restrictions on
the number of sellers in a given territory. See note 15 i'!fra.
The characterization of a restraint as vertical or horizontal is less important than: an understanding of whether the restraint affects only competition between sellers of a single brandintrabrand competition-or also affects competition in the sale of different brands-interbrand
competition. The discussion in this article is therefore applicable not only to vertical restraints but
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under the rule of reason rather than under the per se rule. 3
The Sylvania opinion is noteworthy for its candor; the decision to
overrule United States v. Arnold.. Schwinn & Co. 4 explicitly, rather than
distinguish it artificially, 5 was a refreshing change in an antitrust analysis that has too long supported spurious distinctions. 6 Overruling
also to cases in which dealers agree among themselves to restrict competition in the sale of a single
brand, cases that are typically treated as horizontal restraints. For a typical case of this type, see
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972);
3. The classic definition of the "rule of reason" analysis of antitrust case law was given by
Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of lee;ality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the Court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, .the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
·
Id. at 238.
In contrast, the per se rule requires no consideration of effect; it applies instead to "agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of
the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal per se .' " National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
4. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled in pari, Continental T. Y., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
u.s. 36 (1977).
5. The Court rejected an argument made both in Justice White's concurrenCe, 433 U.S. at
59, and in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's en bane opinion in Sylvania, 537 F.2d 980,
989-90 (9th Cir. 1976), affd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 36 (1977), that Schwinn was distinguishable. Justice White contended that location clauses present "less potential for restraint of intrabrand competition and more potential for stimulating interbrand competition," 433 U.S. at 59
(White, J., concurring), than do the territorial and customer restrictions held per se unlawful in
Schwinn. Because the dealer-services rationale, see text accompanying notes 40-45 i'!fra, supports
location clauses and territorial and customer restrictions, determining their net effect centers on
common analysis, and the majority in Sylvania was therefore correcfin tearing down the Schwinn
per se barrier so that each type of restraint can be analyzed in terms of its net effect in the context
in which it is employed. This leaves open the possibility that the rule of reason, as applied, will
treat various forms of restrictions differently. See Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis
ofNon-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1978) (suggesting per se rules, or rules of
presumptive illegality, for some forms of intrabrand restrictions). Indeed, in Sylvania the Court
did "not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify
per se prohibition," 433 U.S. at 58.
6. The Schwinn opinion itself created an artificial and widely condemned distinction between vertical restrictions imposed in a sales transaction (illegal per se), 388 U.S. at 376, and
vertical restrictions imposed in a consignment arrangement (analyzed under the rule of reason),
id. at 380. See, e.g. , Baker, Vertical Restraints in ]}ines qf Change: From White to Schwinn to
Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 537-38 (1975); Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review--1967, 53 VA. L. REv. 1667, 1682-84 (1967); Pollock, Alternative .Distribution Methods Ajier
Schwinn, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 595,599-600 (1968). The Sylvania Court noted the artificiality of this
distinction to support its decision to overrule rather than distinguish Schwinn. 433 U.S. at 56-57.
Moreover, the inconsil>tency between the Schwinn per se rule for vertical territorial and customer
restrictions and the rule of reason applied to other intrabrand restrictions put pressure on courts to
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Schwinn's per se rule against vertical restraints on territories and customers properly shed a mischievous precedent.? More fundamentally,
in Sylvania the Court seemed to embrace, for the first time, two postulates long advanced by critics of antitrust policy: that the goal of antitrust policy should be to promote consumer welfare, 8 and that because
market efficiencies advance consumer welfare, antitrust policy should
foster business practices that increase market efficiency. 9 At the same
time, the Court made it clear that the substantial advantages of the per
se rule 10--certainty, ease of application, and deterrence--would not be
purchased at· the price of arbitrary or inadvisable results. 11
Despite the significant advances that Sylvania initiated in antitrust
doctrine generally, the doctrine surrounding intrabrand restrictions 12
remains unsatisfactory. 13 Although the Sylvania Court adopted a ruleexpand the per se rule and, by exposing the potential breadth of the Schwinn doctrine, undermined support for it. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 9971000 (9th Cir. 1976), qfjd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
7. As the Supreme Court noted in Sylvania, "Schwinn has been the subject of continuing
controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals and. in the federal courts. The great
weight of scholarly opinion has been critical of the decision, and a number of the federal courts
confronted with analogous vertical restrictions have sought to limit its reach." 433 U.S. 47-48
(footnotes omitted). See id. at 48 nn. 13 & 14.
8. Although the Court was not explicit on this point, the following footnote appears to assume that position: "Competitive economies have social and political as well as economic advantages ... but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective
benchmarks." 433 U.S. at 53 n.21. The Court seemed to reject the view that, without regard to
competitive effects, "the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of
independent businessmen." I d. The Court endorsed the economic orientation of antitrust analysis again in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. I (1979), and National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690-91 n.l6 (1978). For the view that Sylvania should
not be read to preclude an antitrust doctrine based on non-economic goals, see Bohling, A Simpil~
fled Rule ofReasonfor Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and Sylvania, 64 IowA L. REv. 461 (1979).
9. See 433 u.s; at 54-56.
10.. On the virtues of per se rules in the context of vertical restraints, see Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints ifter Sylvania: A Postscript and Comment, 76 MicH. L. REv. 265 (1977); Louis,
Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing
lise ofa Partial Per Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REv. 275, 277-79 (1976); Pitofsky, supra note 5, at
12-14, 33-34.
11. "Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." 433 U.S. at 49-50. "[D]eparture from the rule-of-reason standard must be
based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than--as in Schwlim-upon formalistic line
drawing." I d. at 58-59. The advantages of per se rules "are not sufficient in themselves to justify
the creation ofper se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se
rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law." Id. at 50 n.l6. The
Supreme Court further delineated the scope and role of per se rules in Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. l (1979);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
12. See a discussion of the doctrine at note 2 supra.
13. The antitrust analysis ofintrabrand restrictions has had a disorderly development. Contractual restrictions on resale prices were held unlawful in 1911, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
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of-reason analysis for nonprice vertical restraints, it rea.fiiJ.-med, without
adequate explanation, both the per se rule prohibiting resale pxice
maintenance 14 and the per se rule prohibiting potential competitors
who create a new brand through lawful integration 15 from Jrestricting
competition ill the sale of that brand. 16 Moreover, the rule-of-reason
standard the Court established to deal with nonprice vertical restraints
is unworkable: to say, as the Court did, that "the factfinder weighs all
of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competi.tion"17 offers no guidance unless the relevant circumstances and the
weight to be given them are identified. They were not. 18 Although recPark & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), but Congress granted an exemption to state-sanctioned fair
trade programs in 1937 (the l'.1iller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit. VIII, 50 Siai. 693 (i937) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §I (1952))) and 1952 (the McGuire Act, Pub. L. No. 542,66 Stat. 631 (1952) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952))), only to withdraw the exemption and restore full per se treatment in 1976
(Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ I, 45(a) (1976))). California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, L1c., 445
U.S. 97 (1980). Restrictions on territories and customers, however, were not dealt with by the
Supreme Court (or, with any frequency, by lower courts) until 1964 when, in White Motors v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), the Supreme Court stated that it did not know enough
about such restrictions to articulate a governing rule oflaw before Lria!. Yet only four years later,
without intervening Supreme Court precedent and with little development in the lower courts, the
Court, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967), declared that vertical
restrictions on customers and territories in sales transactions are per se unlawful, a rule that was
extended to intrabrand restrictions imposed by horizontal agreement in United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). Other intrabrand restrictions have been dealt with unde; a rule
of reason and are upheld unless proven to be unlawfully restrictive. See genera/f)• ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 2, at 20-25.
14. 433 U.S. at 51 n.l8.
15. Integration generally comes in one of two forms, exemplified by two major cases. United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (i972), involved a group of relatively small grocery store
chains in various parts of the country that formed a joint buying agency to achieve the cos! economies and promotional benefits of having their own private brand. The territorial restrictions they
placed on their resale of the brand were deemed to be horizontal restraints and were therefore per
se unlawful. fu United States v. Sealy, Jlnc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), a group of mattress manufactmers in different regions of the country were licensed to produce and sell mattresses llilder a national brand name, with attendant standards and quality control. Their agreements to maintain
resale prices and divide territories were also held unlawful per se.
16. 433 U.S. al 58 n.28. These inconsistencies are discussed in Bork, Vertical Restraints:
Schwinn Overntled, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. !71, 189-92, and Posner, The Rule o/ Reason and t/1e
Economic Approach: Reflections 011 t!Je Sylvania Decisio11, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 6-9 (1977). The
author's view on the difference between price and nonprice restraints is outlined in the text accompanying notes 61-93 i'![ra.
17. 433 U.S. at 49.
18. The Court's citation, id. at 49 & n.l5, to the famous but amorphous quotation from
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("The true test of!egality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied
. . .") provides little elaboration of the rule-of-reason standard. The difficulty of formulating
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ognizing that nonprice intrabrand restrictions might promote distributional efficiency, and hence presumably further competition, the Court
completed only half of the rule-of.:-reason analysis because it was unable to say in what ways intrabrand restrictions are anticompetitive. 19
Sylvania simply turned the clock back to 1963, when the Court originally rejected a per se rule against vertical restraints. 20 As was true
then, the Court still does "not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge" 21 to fashion a
workable doctrine.
This article argues that antitrust doctrine concerning intrabrand
restrictions is unsatisfactory because the economic theoq of intra brand
restrictions has been only partially developed and articulated. An unfilled and largely unacknowledged analytical gap exists between the
view that intrabrand restraints are generally anticompetitive22 and the
view that intrabrand restraints are generally efficiency-producing. 23
meaningful jury instructions under this standard is apparent in First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal
Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980).
19. After noting ihat "[t]he market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their
potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand
competition," 433 U.S. at 51-52, the Court summarized "[the] substantial scholarly and judicial
authority supporting [thel economic utility" of vertical restiictions, noting, also, the "relatively
little authority to the contrary." Id. at 57-58. The Court acknowledged the view of some theorists
that manufacturer-imposed intrabrand restrictions are always pro-competitive but, without explanation or citation, dismissed that view as one "not universally shared." 1d. at 56. Rather than
discussing the anticompetitive implications of nonprice intrabrand restrictions, however, the Court
moved on to justify its decision to overrule Schwinn on the ground that the Schwinn distinction
between sale and consignment transactions was untenable.
20. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
21. Id. at 263.
22. See, e.g., Bohling, supra note 8, at 505-07; Carstensen, Vertical Restraints and the
Schwinn Doctrine: Rulesfor the Creation and Dissipation ofEconomic Power, 26 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 771 (1976); Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 28-31; Strasser, Vertical Territorial Restraints Afler
Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977 DUKE L.J. 775, 801-02. Several commentators have advanced the view that intrabrand restraints are anticompetitive because they
induce dealers to engage in promotional product differentiation that insulates the manufacturer
from price competition. See, e.g., Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White
Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419, 1422-25 (1968); Louis, Vertical Distributional
Restraints Under Schwinn 011d Sylvania, supra note 10, at 281. That view, however, is "flawed by
its necessary assumption that a large part of the promotional efforts resulting from vertical restrictions will not convey socially desirable information about product availability, price, quality, and
services." 433 U.S. at 56 n.25.
23. See, e.g., R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 288-98 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 147-67 (1976); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966); Goldberg, The Law andEconomics of Vertical Restrictions:
A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REv. 91, 92, 129 (1979); Posner, AntitnJSt Policy and the
Supreme Court: An Analysis ofthe Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 15 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 293-94 (1975); Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 506, 511-12
(1965); Telser, Why Should Mam!facturers Want Fair Tradel, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960); William-
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That gap is the failme to explore how a manufacturer benefits from
intrabrand restraints other than by increasing the profitability ofhis
dealers. 1'hls article attempts to fill that gap by drawing on the theory
of imperfect competition24 to explain why manufacturers find it profitable to restrict intrabrand competition in an anticompetitive way. Using
this analysis, the article explains why price restraints should indeed be
treated differently from nonprice restraints 25 and formulates an analytical approach under the rule of reason for addressing nonprice vertical
restraints. 26 Non-economic analyses are possible,27 but are not treated
here. The approach of this axti.de rests on economic theory.

l
A.

KNTRABRAND REsTRAmTs

Traditional Explanations.

For years, economists have attempted to explain why a manufacturer would restrict competition between his dealers28 and thus give up
the additional sales that such competition would presumably bring. 29
son, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Anlilntsl Ram!fications of t/Je Transaction Cost ApproacJ:, 127 U. PA. L. R.EV. 953 (1979).

24. The theory of imperfect cqmpetition posits that actual. or perceived differences between
goods may give particular brands market power by insulating them somewhat from competition.
See general/;; E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC CoMPETITION (8th ed. 1962); J.
ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (2d ed. 1969).
The central thesis of the article-that reduced intrabrand competition decreases consumer
welfare by denying important choices to consumers without providing better services-has been
mentioned, but not fully developed, by others. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 379 (1977); Strasser, supra note 22, at 794. See also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
504 (2d ed. 1974) ("resale price maintenance eliminates dealer price competition that might possibly generate dealer resistance to existing wholesale prices"); Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on
Vertical Price Fi-ring: .A .R.ejoinder, 77 YALE L.J. 936, 941 (1968); Gould & Yamey, .Professor .Bork
011 Vertical Price Fixli1g, 76 YALE L.J. 722, 725-26 (1967).
25. This article addresses only agreements fixing minimum prices. For a good argument that
Sylvania can and should be read to overrule the per se rule against maximum price-fixing, see
Halligan, GTE Sylvania: The Case.for Overmling .Albrecht v. Herald Co., 39 Omo ST. L.J. 496
(1978).
26. See also Bohling, supra note 8; Denger, Vertical Restrictions: T/;e Impact o.f Sylvania, 46
ANTITRUST L.J. 908 (i978); Stewart & Roberts, Viabiiity of tile Antitmst Per Se Illegality Rule:
Schwinn .Down, How .Many To Go?, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 727 (1980); Strasser, supra note 22; Zelek,
Stem, & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model Afler Sylvania, 68 CALIJF. L. REV. 13 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Bohling, Jttpra note 8; Flynn, Commentary: Tile Function and .Dy.ifimction ofPer
Se Rules in Vertical Markel Restraints, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 767 (1980).
28. For simplicity, the discussion in the text is presented in the context of direct distribution-the sale by a manufacturer directly to retail dealers for resale to consumers. Distribution
through wholesalers, d,istributors, or jobbers to retail dealers for resale to consumers has special
ramifications, see text accompanying notes 89-93 il!fra, but does not change the basic analysis.
"Dealers" in the text means dealers in one or more, but not all, brands of a given product. Thus, a
consumer electronics dealer might sell several brands (such as Sony, Zenith, Pioneer) of one product (such as stereo amplifiers).
29. See, e.g., P. AREEDA, supra note 24, at 500-01; Telser, supra note 23, at 86-87.
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One explanation-the "manufacturer's cartel" theory-states that competing manufacturers may find that intrabrand restrictions facilitate
collusive or interdependent pricing at the manufacturing level by removing the uncertainty caused by shifting dealer prices, thus allowing
larger manufacturer pro.fits. 30 Intrabrand restraints imposed under the
manufacturer's cartel theory do not produce efficiencies, and are undoubtedly unlawful. 31 These restraints are, however, apparently uncommon and are of little concern as long as they can be distinguished
from intrabrand restrictions with other purposes and effects. 32
In the absence of ·a manufacturer's cartel, intrabrand restrictions
are generally considered a means of increasing the dealer's margin (the
difference between the price a dealer pays for the goods and the price at
which he sells them); 33 most commentators have therefore focused their
analysis of such restrictions by asking why a manufacturer would allow
larger dealer margins than would occur with unrestrained dealer competition. 34 Two theories have been advanced. 35 The "dealer cartel"
30.· For slightly differing perspectives on the manufacturer's-carte1 rationale, compare R
BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox, supra note 23, at 293-95, and Bork, The Rule ifReason, supra
note 23, at 411-15. with Posner, Antitrust Policy" and the Supreme Court, supra note 23, at 294, and
Williamson, supra note 23, at 967.
31. q: United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265,277-79 (1942) (the use of patent and
marketing restrictions by a cartel are unlawful); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940) (per se rule applied to horizontal agreement to remove excess supply from the
market). Similarly, the fair trade exemption was applicable only to commodities in "free and
open competition with commodities of the same general class . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1970)
(repealed 1975).
32. The Supreme Court, however, appears to base the per se rule against resale price maintenance in part on the manufacturers-cartel theory. See text accompanying notes 62-65 i!ifra.
33. See, e.g., M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRATEGY, AND BILATERAL MARKET
PoWER 63 (1976) (resale price maintenance must profit either the dealers or the manufacturer; the
former is said to be the usual presumption); REsALE PrucE MAINTENANCE 3 (B. Yamey ed. 1966).
34. Several reasons for intrabrand restrictions are unrelated to either a manufacturer's cartel
or to increasing the dealer's margin, but they do not appear to have significant policy implications.
A manufacturer niay want to improve the image or prestige .of his product by maintaining high
resale prices as a connotation of quality. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 384. Whether this is in
. fact a motivation for imposing resale price maintenance, and why a manufacturer could not
achieve the same effect dir.ectly by charging high prices to dealers, are unclear. In any event,
society has no econmnic interest in protecting resale price maintenance or other intrabrand restrictions that are so motivated;
Intrabrand restrictions have also been viewed as decreasing the risk dealers face and thus
decreasing capital costs, but this is generally not considered any greater justification for intrabrand
restrictions than it would be for interbrand restrictions. See Comanor, supra note 22 at 1428-29.
Professor Louis, however, argues that vertical restraints Inight be justified on this ground for new
entrants and failing firms because of the long-run benefit of their presence in the market as an
interbrand competitor. Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania,
supra note 10, at 297.
Finally, by separating customers with different demand elasticities, some forms of intrabrand
restrictions-particularly territorial and customer restrictions-may facilitate discrimination between customers. This appears to be a possibility without policy implications in any direction.
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That gap is the Jfailmre to explore how a manufacture1· benefits from
intrabrand restraints other than by increasing the profitability of his
dealers. This article attempts to fill that gap by drawing on the theory
of imperfect competition24 to explain why manufactmers find it pw.fitable to restrict intrab:rand competition in an anticompetitive way. Using
this analysis, the article explains why price restraints should indeed be
treated differently from nonprice restraints25 and formulates an analytical approach under the rule of reason for addressing non price vertical
restraints. 26 Non-economic analyses are possible,27 but are not treated
here. The approach of this artide rests on economic theory.
l

A.

INTRABRAND REsTRAThTTS

Traditional Exp!anatiom.

For years, economists have attempted to explain why a manufactmer would restrict competition between his dealers 28 and thus give up
the additional sales that such competition would presumably bring. 29
son, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Amitrost Ram!ftcations if t!Je Transaction Cost .(ip·
proach, !27 U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1979).
24. The theory of imperfect cqmpetition posits that actual or perceived differences between
goods may giye particular brands market power by insulating them somewhat from competition.
See ge11eralf;• E. CHNv.!BERLIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLISTIC COMPET!TJON (8th ed. 1962); J.
RoBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (2d ed. 1969).
The central thesis of the article-that reduced intrabrand competition decreases consumer
welfare by denying important choices to consumers without providing better services-has been
mentioned, but not fully developed, by others. See L. SULLiVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 379 (1977); Strasser, supra note 22, at 794. See also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
504 (2d ed. 1974) ("resale price maintenance eliminates dealer price competition that might possibly generate dealer resistance to existing wholesale prices"); Gould & Yamey, Prifessor .Bork 011
Vertical Price Fixing: A Rejoinder, 77 YALE L.J. 936, 941 (1968); Gould & Yamey, Prifessor .Bork
on Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L.J. 722, 725-26 (!967).
25. This article addresses only agreements fixing minimum prices. For a good argument thai
Sj•b•ania can and should be read to overrule the per se rule against maximum price-fixing, see
Halligan, GTE Sylvania: The Case for OPeTruling .Albrecht v. He;ald Co., 39 OHIO ST. LJ. 496
(1978).
26. See also Bohling, supra note 8; Denger, Vertical Restrictions: The Impact if Sylvania, 46
ANTITRUST L.J. 908 (1978); Stewart & Roberts, Viability if the Antitrust Per Se Illegality Rule:
Schwinn .Down, How J}.fany To Go?, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 727 (1980); Strasser, supra note 22; Zelek,
Stern, & Dunfee, A Rule ifReaso11 .Decision Jliodel Afler Sylvania, 68 CALJF. L REV. 13 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Bohling, supra note 8; Flynn, Commentary: The Function and .Dy.ifimction ofPer
Se Rules in Vertical Markel Restraints, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 767 (1980).
28. For simplicity, the discussion in the text is presented in the context of direct distribution-the sale by a manufacturer directly to retail dealers for resale to consumers. Distribution
through wholesalers, distributors, or jobbers to retail dealers for resale to consumers has special
ramifications, see text accompanying notes 89-93 i1yra, but does not change the basic analysis.
"Dealers" in the text means dealers in one o:r more, bu! not all, brands of a given product. Thus, a
consumer electronics dealer might sell several brands (such as Sony, Zenith, Pioneer) of one product (such as stereo amplifiers).
29. See, e.g., P. AREEDA, supra note 2'l, a! 500-01; Telser, supra note 23, at 86-87.
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One explanation-the "manufacturer's cartel" theory-states that competing manufacturers may find that intrabrand restrictions facilitate
.collusive or interdependent pricing at the manufacturing level by removing the uncertainty caused by shifting dealer prices, thus allowing
larger manufacturer profits. 30 Intrabrand restraints imposed under the
inanufacturer's cartel theory do not produce efficiencies, and are Ulidoubtedly unlawful. 31 These restraints are, however, apparently uncommon and are of little concern as long as they can be distinguished
from intrabrand restrictions with other purposes and effects. 32
In the absence of a manufacturer's cartel, intrabrand restrictions
are generally considered a means of increasing the dealer's margin (the
difference between the price a dealer pays for the goods and the price at
which he sells them); 33 most commentators have therefore focused their
analysis of such restrictions by asking why a manufacturer would allow
larger dealer margins than would occur with unrestrained dealer competition.34 Two theories have been advanced. 35 The "dealer cartel"
30. For slightly differing perspectives on the manufacturers-cartel rationale, compare R.
BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 23, at 293-95, and Bork, The Rule of Reason, supra
note 23, at 411-15.with Posnei,Antitrust Policy and tlze Supreme Court, supra note 23, at 294, and
Williamson, supra note 23, at 967.
31. q. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277-79 {1942) (the use of patent and
marketing restrictions by a cartel are unlawful); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940) (per se rule applied to horizontal agreement to remove excess supply from the
market). Similarly, the fair trade exemption was applicable only to commodities in "free and
open competition with commodities of the same general class . . . . " 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1970)
(repealed 1975).
32. The Supreme Court, however, appears to base the per se rule against resale price maintenance in part on the manufacturers-cartel theory. See text accompanying notes 62-65 infra.
33. See, e.g., M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRATEGY, AND BILATERAL MARKET
PoWER 63 (1976) (resale price maintenance must profit either the dealers or the manufacturer; the
former is said to be the usual presumption); RESALE PRicE MAINTENANCE 3 (B. Yamey ed. 1966).
34. Several reasons for intrabrand restrictions are unrelated to either a manufacturer's cartel
or to increasing the dealer's margin. but they do not appear to have significant policy implications.
A manufacturer niay want to improve the image or prestige .of his product by maintaining high
resale prices as a connotation of quality. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 384. Whether this is in
fact a motivation for imposing resale price maintenance, and why a manufacturer could not
achieve the same effect directly by charging high prices to dealers, are unclear. In any event,
society has no economic interest in protecting resale price maintenance or other intrabrand restrictions that are so motivated;
lntrabrand restrictions have also been viewed as decreasing the risk dealers face and thus
decreasing capital costs, but this is generally not considered any greater justification for intrabrand
restrictions than it would be for interbrand restrictions. See Comanor, supra note 22 at 1428-29.
Professor Louis, however, argues that vertical restraints might be justified on this ground for new
entrants and failing firms because of the long-run benefit of their presence in the market as an
interbrand competitor. Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania,
supra note 10, at 297.
Finally, by separating customers with different demand elasticities, some forms of intrabrand
restrictions-particularly territorial and customer restrictions-may facilitate discrimination between customers. This appears to be a possibility without policy implications in any direction.
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restrictions by a dealer cartel. U dealers refuse to distribute a manufacturer's goods unless he guarantees them freedom from intrab:rand
competition, the manufacturer may Ielinquish some of his profit to the
dealers as the price for getting his product distributed. ][n such cases,
the manufacturer is merely the "eat's paw" of the dealer cartel.3 7 Difficulties of identification and proof complicate any analysis of the dealercartel problem, 38 but once identified, such cartels are readily held to be
unlawfuP 9
The "dealer services" explanation for intrabrand restrictions holds
that a manufacturer restricts intrabrand competition to induce his dealers to undertake greater nonprice competition by using, for example,
advertising, showrooms, product demonstrations, and wananty and repair services. 40 Under this view, such activities increase consumer wel36

See, e.g., R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 23, at 295, 394-401; Bowman, Resale
Price Afaintenance, 22 U. CH!. L. REV. 325, 839-40 (1955) . .But see Pitofsky, stpra note 5, at 31-32
(suggesting that a manufacturer's prohibition of sales by dealers to the manufacturer's customers,
which may facilitate discrimination, is per se unlawful).
35. The two categories come from R. PosNER, supra note 23, at 148. Other possibilities cannot be discounted. Intrabrand restrictions may be used to compensate dealers for agreeing not to
sell competing brands, in which event the legality of the intrabrand restraint may tum on the
legality of the resulting exclusive dealing arrangement. M. PoRTER, supra note 33, at 59. Professor Caves, in an analysis that in some respects parallels the analysis in this article, argues thai
intra brand restrictions may reflect the market power of dealers and arise from joint profit-maximizing through bargaining. Caves, Vertical Restraints as Integration b)' Contract: Evidence and
Policy Implications, forthcoming in The Journal of Industrial Economics (on file with the author).
36. R. Boruc, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 23, at 292; R. POSNER, supra note 23, at
148; Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 28-30.
37. R. PoSNER, supra note 23, at 148.
38. As Professor Posner has argued, because dealers are in a good position to evaluate consumer demand, they have a legitimate need to communicate with the manufacturer concerning the
free-rider problem and dealer delivery of services. R. PosNER, supra note 23, at 165. If a manufacturer imposes intrabrand restraints in response to such communication the situation may look
like a dealer cartel even though the manufacturer is acting only to increase dealer services, see text
accompanying notes 41-42 i1y'Ta, not dealer profits. See, e.g., Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625
F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussions between manufacturer and dealer prior to restraints are not
themselves proof of unlawful dealers' agreements). On the other hand, true dealer cartels--those
that attempt to increase dealer profits without increasing dealer services-may be imperceptible.
See Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 31. The approach advocated in this article would avoid these
problems by sustaining any intrabrand restriction designed to increase dealer services and invalidating any restrictions designed to increase either manufacturer or dealer profits without inducing
services.
39. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1917). q. United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal division of intra brand markets is per se unlawful);
United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967) (territorial restraints imposed by a dealer cartel
were held unlawful, but because of their role as part of a series of price restraints).
40. The dealer-services rationale covers many types of efficiencies associated with intnibrand
restrictions. The inapplicability of the theory to resale price maintenance is discussed in the text
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fare and interbrand competition.41 Furthermore, the dealer-services
theory states that intrabrand restrictions are necessary to achieve those
purposes: no dealer would increase advertising and other customer
services if he thought that other dealers could cut prices and make
sales-take a "free ride"-on the basis of his promotional expenditures.42
The dealer-services theory offers one reason why, even in the absence of a dealer cartel, a manufacturer would impose intrabrand restrictions, and why restrictions imposed for that reason enhance
competition.43 Writers of the so-called "Chicago school"44 have argued
that absent a dealer cartel both price and nonprice intrabrand restrictions must increase dealer services and promote competition, because a
manufacturer would never impose the restrictions unless they induced
demand-promoting, consumer-satisfying activities by his dealers.
These writers acknowledge the possibility of a dealer or a manufacturer
cartel, but assume that such cartels are infrequent and that they can be
separately identified and dealt with, or ignored. 45 The Court, however,
has never fully endorsed. the position taken by the Chicago school. Although the Supreme Court adopted the dealer-services theory in Sylvania to justify applying the rule-of-reason standard to _nonprice
accompanying notes 72-86 i'!fra; its applicability to nonprice restraints is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 118-29 i'![ra. For informative descriptions of the theory, see Goldberg, supra
note 23, at 106-11; Williamson, supra note 23, at 975-80. One writer argues, however, that no
policy implications should be drawn from the dealer-services rationale. See L. SuLLIVAN, supra
note 24, at 412-16.
41. See, e.g., R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 23, at 290-91 (1978); R. PosNER, supra note 23, at 148-50; Bork, The Rule of Reason, supra note 23, at 429-65.
42. Usually free riding occurs because consumers can get a service without having to buy the
product from the dealer who provides the service. For example, some high-fidelity equipment
dealers provide a listening room where customers can compare different stereo components. Once
he decides which brand to buy, a customer can then make the purchase from a discount dealer.
See R. PosNER, supra note 23, at 149.
43. If some consumers will purchase the product with or without dealer services, while other
consumers will purchase the product only with the services, a manufacturer imposing intrabrand
restraints to improve dealer services could conceivably increase his profits without increasing consumer welfare; the welfare gain to those consumers who want services could be offset by the
welfare loss to those consumers who continue to buy the product but do not consider the services
valuable. Abbott, Paradox Regained: Toward a "New Economic Approach" to Vertical Restraints
Policy 8-9 (FTC Staff Paper on file with the JJuke Law Journal). See also Spence, Product Differentiation and We(fare, 66 AM. EcoN. REv. 407 (1976) (product differentiation that is profitable for
the manufacturer may not increase consumer welfare). No one has offered, however, a practical
way to identify such situations.
44. See Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrost Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1975).
45. See, e.g., R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 23, at 292-95; Posner, The Next
Step in the Antiirost Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6,
23-25 (1981).
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restraints, 46 it failed to apply the same standard to price restrainis:n
Moreover, the Court apparently refused to accept the dealier-services
rationale as a complete explanation for nonprice restraints. 48 Although
the Court's explanations are not persuasive, 49 it reached the correct result. Resale price maintenance cannot be explained by the dealer-services rationale; 50 a separate rationale-the competitive-advantages
rationale--explains both the per se treatment of resale price maintenance and the anticompetitive effects of nonprice restraints.
B.

The Competitive-Advantages Explanation.

Although the cartel theories and the dealer-services theory undoubtedly fit some sets of facts, they ignore circumstances in which
manufacturers impose intrabrand restrictions to gain increased profits
by keeping their prices to dealers higher than otherwise would be possible, without expecting that dealers' margins or dealers' services will increase. A manufacturer who, because of either product differentiation
or a cost advantage, enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals has the
potential to earn greater profits than he otherwise would. 51 Without
intrabrand :restraints, however, the profits :resulting from a competitive
advantage could be lost through intrabrand competition.
If intrabrand competition is possible, the elasticity of demand 5 2 for
a brand from a particular dealer usually exceeds the elasticity of demand for the brand collectively because consumers can readily obtain
the identical brand from any dealer; a price decrease by any one dealer
should bring a substantial increase in sales by diverting customers from
rival dealers-a result that benefits the price-cutting dealer53 but not
46. 433 u.s. 36, 54-55.
47 . .fd. at 51 n.l8.
48. I d. at 56 ("the view that the manufacturer's interest necessarily corresponds with that of
the public is not universally shared"); id. at 58 ("we do not foreclose the possibility that particular
applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se proltibitions ...").
49. See text accompanying notes 61-69 1;?(ra.
50. See text accompanying notes 72-84 i'!fra.
51. The idea that differentiation among competing brands should make a difference in economic analysis derives fro~ the theory of imperfect competition. See note 24 supra. The recent
literature on product differentiation and market structure is reviewed in F. ScHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMlC PERFORMANCE ch. 14 (2d ed. 1980).
52. Price elasticity of demand is the ratio of the change in the quantity of a product demanded resulting from a change in the product's price. Landes & Posner, JYarket Power in Anti~
tmst Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937, 940 n.8 (1981).
53. A dealer will want to increase his sales whenever the marginal cost of additional sales is
less than the marginal revenue to be derived from addi~ional sales. Under conditions of elastic
demand the dealer's price need be decreased only slightly to add additional sales; when ]tis cost of
goods (the major portion of his marginal cost) is constant, the dealer is likely to view additional
sales as profitable ones. The profitability of additional sl!Jes is even greater if, as may often be the
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the manufacturer. Moreover, because dealers have different cost and
demand characteristics, 54 competition between dealers of the same
brand is likely; 55 when it occurs, dealer margins will diminish. As margins shrink, dealers on the edge of profitability will either go out of
business, stop carrying the cut-price brand, or press the manufacturer
to reduce wholesale prices.
A manufacturer with a competitive advantage can cut his wholesale price and still earn a competitive profit; he is therefore especially
susceptible to pressure for lower prices if dealers can credibly threaten
to drop his brand otherwise. Because dealers are generally indifferent
to the brands of products they sell except to the extent that some brands
promise greater profit than others, they can indeed switch, or threaten
to switch, from selling one manufacturer's product to selling another's,
depending on which product offers the greatest potential profit. In effect, manufacturers buy distribution outlets, and they bid against each
other for the best outlets by offering· the dealer profit potential. 56 If a
manufacturer cannot offer his existing dealers as much profit as rival
manufacturers, the dealers will switch suppliers. 57 Intrabrand competition thus results in downward pressure on the manufacturer's wholesale
prices. 5 8
case, his marginal cost of selling (shelf space, employees, etc.) decreases with increasing output, or
if the manufacturer gives quantity discounts.
54. Some dealers will inevitably be more efficient or more aggressive than others; some will
have lower maintenance costs, or more attractive locations. In addition, the same brand is often
sold through different types of retailers, whose costs and sales strategies are likely to differ markedly. See generally M. PoRTER, supra note 33, at 38-42.
55. See REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, supra note 33, at 4-5. See also Comanor, supra note
22, at 1426. Manufacturers cannot selectively raise their wholesale prices to dealers to stop intrabrand competition, both because such refined price determinations are impractical, and because they might be unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). See
Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964). q. Interstate
Cigar Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. ~ 63,430 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a large discount to
new dealers does not adversely affect competition).
56. See, e.g., R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST P~ox, supra note 23, at 293; Note, Restricted
Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 795, 805-06 (1962).
Recent scholarship has emphasized that dealers derive bargaining power from the structure
of retailing markets and from the fact that dealer services are an important influence on consumer
demand. M. PORTER, supra note 33, at ch. 2. Whatever the relative bargaining strengths ofretailers and manufacturers, the competitive-advantages rationale explains that imposing intrabrand
restrictions maximizes the manufacturer's use of his bargaining power. Acknowledging the bargaining power of dealers merely confirms the difficulty a manufacturer has in restricting intrabrand competition by charging high prices to his dealers.
57. But see note 92 i'!fra.
58. Nor can a manufacturer easily replace a dealer threatening to drop his brand. A replacement dealer will demand an adequate return just as the original dealer did. Losing a dealer's
outlet altogether would leave the manufacturer worse off, or else he would not have sold to that
dealer in the first place.
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No doubt dealers and manufacturers bluff to a degree about 'v,rho
will switch away from whom, but :in the aggregate dealers and manufacturers bargain toward an equilibrium at which the dealers' profitability will be roughly equal for all the brands. ][[this equality were not
attained, dealers would make more money on some brands than others;
they would then have an :incentive to drop a lower-profit brand and to
increase their volume of a higher-profit one or to press the manufacturer to lower his prices, and the cycle would start over. The cycle
ends-and equilibrium is reached-when no manufacturer can reduce
his wholesale price without selling below his own cost (:including a
competitive profit)~ rvianufacturer competition for dealers ends and no
dealer can credibly threaten to switch to a rival manufacturer. At this
equilibrium point, however, a manufacturer with a competitive advantage cannot profit from that advantage.
Suppose, for example, that when a market is 1n eqtri11briurn a
manufacturer :introduces a new, more attractive brand. Xf the aHrac1t
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·should be able to charge proportionally higher vvholesale prices; dealers

will charge higher retail prices but will earn the same profit as on the
lower-quality, lower-priced brands. Dealer pressure for lower wholesale prices will be ineffective and will eventually abate because no manufacturer will have the ability or incentive to lower prices.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the attractiveness of the new
brand does not result from higher costs to the manufacturer but resuhs
from, for example, strong brand-name recognition by consumers. U
the manufacturer can still charge the higher wholesale price, he will
earn a more-than-competitive profit As dealers seek the equilibrium
retail price for the brand, however, they will compete with one another
and barga:in for lower wholesale prices from the manufacturer. Two
circumstances put the dealers in a good bargaining position: fust, the
manufacturer, by hypothesis, is earning unusually high profits and can
therefore afford to reduce his prices, and second, the dealers can forcefully threaten to drop the brand or refuse to carry it initially. The likelihood that dealer pressure will succeed is thus much greater in these
circumstances than when the market is at equilibrium, and ultimately a
new equilibrium will be reached at which the manufacturer .earns less
than he would if his dealers were not engag:ing :in intra brand competi.i:ion. The manufacturer can avoid these pressures if he restricts competition among dealers.
llntrabrand restraints imposed by a manufacturer thus may be
neither a response to a dealer cartd nor aiiJl implementatioiiJl of a legiti-
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mate desire to promote dealer services. Instead, they may be imposed
to enable the manufacturer to capture the profit arising from an advantage that his product has over a rival's product, and to do so by eliminating the possibility that his dealers will compete such profits away
through intrabrand competition. This is called the competitive-advantages rationale. 59 Restrictions imposed under the competitive-advantages rationale are unjustifiable because they remove market forces that
would otherwise lower prices to consumers, without inducing greater
dealer services. Moreover, such restrictions are unnecessary to spur the
manufacturer to improve his product's quality or his efficiency; that
incentive comes from interbrand, not intrabrand, corrapetition.6° Most
important, the competitive-advantages rationale for intrabrand restraints explains the Supreme Court's distinction between price and
nonprice restraints.
II.

PRICE AND NoNPRICE RESTRAINTS

The Sylvania Court's rationale for distinguishing price from nonprice restraints was Justice Brennan's concurring statement in White
Motor Co. v. United States 61 that "[r]esale price maintenance is not
only designed to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price competition not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite as
59. The competitive-advantages rationale demonstrates that dealers need not form a cartel to
exercise their bargaining power over manufacturers. Instead, dealer pressure for lower wholesale
prices or intrabrand restraints results from individual reactions by dealers to the erosion of profits
from intrabrand competition. When the manufacturer imposes intrabrand restraints to forestall
such pressure tlie result is the same as that produced by a formal dealer cartel-except the manufacturer, not the dealers, gets the extra profit. Recent cases provide an accurate depiction of dealer
pressure that is unrelated to either formal dealer cartels or the free-rider problem. See, e.g. ,
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). See also H.L. Moore Drug
Exchange v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas.~ 62,674 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (relying on dealer communication to deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but not considering whether
the communications related to a free-rider problem).
60. It cannot be argued convincingly that competitive advantages are too insignificant a phenomenon to warrant attention. Compare Posner, 0/igopo/istic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and
Economic Welfare: A Reply to Professor Markovits, 28 STAN. L. REv. 903, 912 (1976) W1~h Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REv. 919, 937-38 (1976). Even the dealerservices theory assumes that individual brands have, or can obtain, some competitive advantage;
without market power derived from a competitive advantage, intrabrand restrictions would be
profitable for neither t4e manufacturer nor the dealer. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 14950; Bowman, supra note 34, at 848-49; Holahan, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 J. EcoN. THEORY
411 (1979) (a competitive manufacturer does not benefit from resale price maintenance); Preston,
supra note 23, at 518. Given the competitive-advantages rationale, it is not surprising to observe
that many of the products on which resale prices have been fixed are highly differentiated, widely
recognized brand names on which no dealer services are required See, e.g. , Eastman Kodak Co.
v. FTC, 158 F.~d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1947). Compare REsALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE, supra note 33, at 67 with M. PORTER, supra note 33, at 23-30.
61. 372 u.s. 253 (1963).
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much betH-'eert that product and competing b:rands." 62 This assertion is

unsupported, 63 ambiguous, 64 and, at best, an argument supporting per
se treatment only in concentrated industries where the significant firms
engage in resale price-fixing through separate dealers. 65 The Court's
additional assertion 66 that Congress endorsed the per se rule as applicable to resale price maintenance when it repealed the fair trade laws67
also fails to support disparate treatment for price and nonprice restraints.68 Thus, the Court provided no adequate answer for critics who
pointed out the apparent inconsistency of treating nonprice restraints,
which may prohibit both price and nonprice competition, less harshly
than price restraints, v;hich prohibit only price competition. 69
V!hen examined closely, however, differences in the effects of price
and nonprice restraints fully justify their disparate treatment. Briefly
stated, price restraints are almost always likely to be explained by the
competitive-advantages rationale and never by the dealer-services rationale. Price restraints are therefore appropriately treated under a per
se rule. l"{onprice restraints, ho\vever, may be explained by the dealer=
services rationale and should therefore be treated under a rule-of-reason analysis that seeks to measure the effect of the restraint
62. Jd, at 268 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
63. The sole support for Justice Brennan's statement was United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45-47 (1960), which is distinguishable because it analogized resale price maintenance to a dealer cartel and concerned only decreased intrabrand competition.
64. If the statement by Justice Brennan means thai resale price maintenance diverts intrabrand competition from price competition to service competition, it does not serve to distinguish price from non price restraints, and is inconsistent with the Court's simultaneous rejection of
the argument that product dilferentiation is necessarily contrary to consumer welfare. 433 U.S. at
56 n.25. If the stJltement means that resale price maintenance may support manufacturer cartelization, it is subject to severe limitations. See Bork, supra note 16, at 190-91; Posner, supra note
16, at 7-8. But see Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 15-16.
65. See Posner, TJze Rule o/ Reason, supra note 16, at 7-8.
66. 433 U.S. at 51 n.l8.
67. Congress repealed the fai.Jr trade laws in the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 80!, cod!fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1976) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ I,
45(a) (1970)).
68. See Bork, supra note !6, at 191-92; Posner, supra note 16, at 8-9. If Congress did legislate
a per se rule for vertical price fixing when it repealed the fair trade laws, the inference could be
drawn that it was bringing the law relating to price restraints into line with that relating to nonprice restraints, which at the time was governed in part by the per se rule of United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). If so, the overruling of Sclzwimz would be inconsistent with Congress's intentions.
69. R. Boruc, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 23, at 288-91; Posner, supra note 45, at
9.
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A. Resale Price Maintenance.
The defect in the theory supporting the legality of resale price
maintenance is the assumption that by diminishing price competition
the manufacturer stops free riding and induces competition in services
that is in his and the consumer's interests. 70 In fact, resale price maintenance does not overcome the free-rider problem; nor does it induce
any nonprice competition that benefits consumers. Minimum price restraints can be explained only by the competitive-advantages rationale.
1. Nonprice Competition and Resale Price Maintenance. Resale
price maintenance cuts off price competition, the most effective means
of intrabrand rivalry and the form of rivalry that is most likely to reduce the manufacturer's profits from a competitive advantage. By contrast, the nonprice competition permitted under resale price
maintenance is often ineffectual; beyond some level of dealer services,
consumers will cease to respond to additional investment in services,
even if they would have responded t~ price decreases. 71 Indeed, when
resale prices are fixed and the manufacturer gives the dealers a margin
that is both competitive with that given by other manufacturers and
sufficient to provide tlie amount of dealer services the man;ufacturer
desires, the dealer's incentive to engage in intrabrand competition
through additional nonprice rivalry would appear to be small; if consumer demand were responsive to dealer services, the manufacturer
would want them to be provided. Under these circumstances, resale
price maintenance reduces all pressure for lower wholesale prices.
2. .Dealer Services and Resale Price Maintenance. Moreover, con70. See, e.g., R. PoSNER, supra note 23, at 148:
If the manufacturer fixes a minimum resale price that exceeds the cost of reselling his
product without .. · ~ services, but non-price (i.e., service) competition among the dealers
is not constrained, the dealers will step up such competition among themselves-i.e.,
increase the provision of services . . . . They will continue to increase their outlays on
service competition until the marginal cost of distribution has risen to meet the resale
price. When that point is reached the dealers will not be receiving any monopoly profits
but will instead be furnishing the level of services desired by the manufacturer.
I d. Professor Posner thus makes it clear. that the assumption of "effective non-price competition
among the dealers," id., is a prerequisite to the dealer-services rationale.
71. A dealer with a showroom, for example, is unlikely to attract customers from a rival
dealer by making the showroom even more lavish, but is able to attract customers from rival
dealers by continuing to reduce his prices. The relative ineffectiveness of nonprice competition as
a form ofintrabrand competition is implicit in much of the analysis ofintrabrand restraints. Bowman, supra note 34, at 825, 830 n.29 (dealer cartels are content to fix only prices, without significant concern that nonprice competition will subvert the profitability of cartels); Comanor, supra
note 22, at 1426 (a manufacturer cannot finance service competition by reducing prices to dealers
because dealers will instead engage in price competition); Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on
Vertical Price Fixing.· A Rejoinder, supra note 24, at 941.
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fixing resale p1ices, to overcome any free-riding competition that undermines desirable dealer services. Even after prices are fixed, a dealer
may take a free ride by offering an :inexpensive increment of service or
value to. take customers away from dealers who offer more expensive
serv1ces.
Suppose, for example, that one dealer offers a large showroom
with helpful, knowledgeable sales clerks. Even if resale prices are
.fixed, another dealer can still take a free ride on those services by offering free gifts on each sale, free home delivery, or advantageous credit
terms, without ever investing in a showroom or sales-clerk training. 73
Consumers can examine and try out the product with the fust dealer
and then buy from the second. As long as the second dealer's bonus
has some attraction to consumers but· c-osts less than the first dealer's
showroom and sales training, the second dealer can take a f:ree ride at
the expense of the fust. This free riding discourages the first dealer
from investing in the showroom-precisely the type of free-rider problem that price restrictions purportedly overcome.
Of course, if rivals are :induced to increase services of some k.i.nd,
even if not showrooms, the suppression of price competition appears to
meet its· objective of inducing dealer services. But this is hardly the
effective nonp:n.ice competition that supports the dealer-services rationale. First, dealer services such as showrooms can be so easily undercut
by cheaper, ·free-riding nonprice competition Wre free gifts that no
dealer would have an incentive to pwvide the more expensive services.
Successive rounds of nonprice competition undercutting the expensive
dealer services of rivals would, in all. probability, uniformly reduce
dealer services to those that could be provided at low cost.7 4 Second,
because services on which a free ride can be taken can be undercut by
services-like gifts--on which a free ride cannot be taken, the most
likely outcome of successive rounds of nonprice competition would be
an increase :in the amoun~ of dealer services on which free rides could
not be taken. Whether these services are valuable to consumers misses
the point; the market will generate these services in accordance with
tr!'l
-~~~
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72. See note 44 supra.
73. Such forms ofnonprice competition were co=on when prices were fixed under the fair
trade laws. See, e.g., Vomado v. Coming Glass Works, 388 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1968) (trading
stamps for fair-traded items); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Max Dichter & Sons, 142 F. Supp. 545 (D.
Mass. 1956) (trading stamps for fair-traded items); Jn re Schwanhausser, 52 F.T.C. 28 (1955)
(trade-in allowances given).
74. The fact that nonprice free-riding competition leads to less expensive dealer services is
another example of the fact that the nonprice rivalry remaining after resale prices are fixed is an
ineffective form of rivalry. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
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consumer demand even without any special inducements by the manufacturer.75 Systematic resale price-fixing therefore cannot be explained
by the dealer-services rationale.
This is not to say that there is no free-rider problem in the showroom example-there is. And overcoming the problem through a
dealer's contractual commitments to supply services, some forms of
nonprice vertical restraints,7 6 or other means77 should be permitted.
But the fact that dealers whose prices are fixed have showrooms does
not prove that the showrooms result from price-fixing.
Two further arguments are commonly made to show that resale
price maintenance induces dealer services: the uniformity argument
and the market coverage argument. With respect to the gasoline retail
industry, for example, Professor Bork argues that the oil companies
have a legitimate interest in ensuring that their retail o-qtlets provide a
uniformly high level of service78 because a high level of service creates
good will, which in tum induces repeat sales. Without price restraints,
goes the argument, some dealers may ignore service, taking a free ride
on the good will created by the dealers who do give service, degrading
the brand's image, and destroying its good will. With price restraints,
dealers will engage in service competition.
Concededly, oil companies have an interest in ensuring that dealers do not degrade their products by providing poor service. That is
why contractual commitments by the dealer to provide services are enforceable,79 and why Sylvania permits restrictions that keep gasoline
75. H a free-rider·probleQJ. does not exist, the value of services to consumers can be appropriated only by sellers who offer the services. In this circumstance, to allow a manufacturer to induce
dealer services would misallocate resources by requiring consumers to pay for more services than
they desire.
76. · See note 87 infra.
77. A manufacturer has several ways other than contractual commitments to overcome the
free-rider problem, including customer restrictions (which, if lawful, permit a manufacturer to
restrict distribution to dealers that provide the services desired by the manufacturer}, direct payments to dealers who provide the desired services, and the direct provision of.services by manufacturers themselves. Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 22-23; Telser, supra note 23, at 92-94 (arguing,
however, that these alternatives are too costly or ineffective to be meaningful). None of these
methods is costless, but in view of the inability of resale price maintenance to overcome the freerider problem, they are the only means available.
78. Bork, The Rule of Reason, supra note 23, at 454-56.
79. See, e.g., Frisard v. Texaco, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1094 (E.D. La. 1979); Malone v. Crown
Central Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1979); D & M Distribs., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
1970 Trade Cas. ~ 73,099 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Dealer terminators in the petroleum indnstry are now
regulated by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2805, 2821-2824, 2841 (Supp. II 1978)), which permits terminations for
"failure by the franchisee to comply with any provision of the franchise, which provision is both
reasonable and of material significance to the franchise relationship . . . ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 2802(b)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
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out of the hands of lov1 quality dealers. 80 But :resale price maintenance

does not ensure competition to provide services, much less a uniform
level of service; an analysis of the gasoline retail trade shows why.
Consider three types of consumers: first, those who investigate the
type of service they will get before they buy; second, repeat customers,
who buy from a dealer on the basis of past experience with that dealer;
and third, customers who want service but buy from one dealer on the
basis of an earlier experience with a different dealer of the same brand.·
For consumers who shop for gasoline by investigating in advance the
services they will get, and for repeat customers, free riding is impossible; consumers will shop and pay for the services they want. The need
to impose resale price maintenance to stop free riding arises, therefore,
only if customers purchase gasoline on the basis of their past experience with a particular brand, rather than on the basis of their experience with a particular station. Even in this situation, however, dealers
can continue to take a free ride after resale prices are fixed: they can
provide poor service and simply pocket that portion of the dealer mar-

gin that other dealers invest in providing service and generating good
will. It is thus irrelevant to say in this example that "any dealer who
did not [compete on a service basis] would lose business." 81 The loss of
business· would come only from careful shoppers and repeat customers-those for whom free riding is impossible, and for whom the market would provide services without resale price maintenance.
An alternate argument for resale price maintenance 1n the gasoline
industry and other industries 82 states that uniform price levels permit a
manufacturer to sell to many outlets, including some inefficient ones,
and thus achieve a market saturation that puts the product within the
convenient reach of consumers. 83 Gasoline, under this view, is a convenience good because consumers want it where and when they need :it
80. See, e.g., Reno West Coast Dist. Co. v. The Mead Corp., 613 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979). See also Co=ent, Retail Gasoline Franchise Terminations and
Nonrenewals Under Tille I if the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 1980 DUKE L.J. 522.
8 l. Bork, The Rule if Reason, supra note 23, at 455. As Professor Bork recognizes, id. 456
n.l6l, the market itself generally promotes the manufacturer's interest in uniformity: dealers are
induced to give services in_ order to retain the patronage of their many repeat customers, and
because they cannot discriminate between repeat and one-time customers, they must give the same
services to all. The manufacturer's concern with the free-rider problem arises, therefore, only
when the dealer is indifferent to repeat customers or when repeat customers are indifferent to
services-both unlikely occurrences.
82. See, e.g., P. AREEDA, supra note 24, at 503-04; M. PoRTER, supra note-33, at 66; L. SuLLJVAN, supra note 24, at 382-83. The Chicago-schcol 1Vriters do not discuss this argument in the
context of resale price maintenance, presumably because they have rejected it.
83. This argument is refuted, in the context ofnonprice vertical restraints, in Comanor, supra
note 22, at 1430.
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and are therefore as likely to have their purchasing decisions influenced
by availability as by price or services. Resale price maintenance therefore supposedly serves the manufacturer's and the consumer's interest
in ensuring availability. Increased convenience makes up for the value
consumers lose from the lack of price competition; if it did not, the
·
manufacturer would not fix prices.
This argument misses an important point. If gasoline is really a
convenience good, consumers will not shop between stations on the basis of price, so that intrabrand competition will not be strong enough
either to drive prices down or to force inefficient gasoline dealers out of
business. The manufactwer therefore need not restrain price competition to keep inefficient dealers in the market and ensure adequate market coverage. Consumers who want convenience will pay for it and
keep inefficient dealers in business.
To be sure, some consumers value convenience and others value
price competition. Those who value price competition might force
dealers of the same brand to compete against one another, driving the
inefficient dealers out of business and depriving the other consumers of
the convenience they value. This possibility does not, however, explain
or justify resale price maintenance. First, if the manufacturer set the
resale price too high, consumers who value price competition might
switch to other brands. If so, the manufacturer would be acting against
his interest because the value of convenience to the consumers who
liked convenience must have been less than the value of price competition to those consumers who valued price competition. Had it not been
less, the market would have supplied more convenience. 84 The second
possibility is that after the imposition of resale price maintenance, those
consumers who value price competition might continue to buy the
same brand, but at the higher, fixed price, permitting the manufacturer
to satisfy those consumers who like convenience without diverting
price-sensitive consumers to other brands. If consumers value convenience, it makes economic sense for a manufacturer to subsidize otherwise inefficient stations to ensure convenience, but the manufact"urer
should pay for the subsidy out of his own pocket, rather than that of
consumers who value price competition. Intrabrand competition cannot threaten his ability to serve those customers who. are willing to pay
for convenience; he therefore need not restrain intrabrand competition
to provide that convenience. Of course, the gasoline producer may
want to impose resale price maintenance to increase his own profits and
84. That is, those "inefficient" dealers who are nonetheless convenient will not compete on
the basis of price for sales to consumers who shop primarily by price, but will instead attract
consumers who value convenience and are willing to pay higher prices for it.
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use those p:rofits to subsidize inefficient dealers, but that would be no
legitimate or p.ro-competitive than if he fixed prices with his competitors in order to finance more convenient service. Price restraints in
this situation ought to be illegal.
In short, because resale price maintenance does not overcome the
free-rider problem, it cannot induce dealer services that the free market
does not provide. The dealer-services rationale thus fails to explain
resale price maintenance. The competitive-advantages rationale, by
contrast, does explain resale price maintenance. A manufacturer will
permit his dealers to earn a margin that finances the level of services
necess3:r; for effective interbra1td COll.llpetition; deale:rs are unlikely to
find additional nonprice competition to be an effective fmm of intrabrand rivalry, and it will not occm. 85 Thus, when a manufacturer
fixes resale prices he generally need not fear that nonprice competition
between his dealers will erode dealer margins and put pressure on him
to lower his price to dealers; resale price maintenance eliminates all
h:;:rms of 1nterdealer cornpetition that threaten a manufacturer's profit
Under any welfare analysis, therefore, ithe per se rule against Fesale
'1)"\~,r'&&:;l. mam·
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Nonprice Restrictions.

Kn contmst to price restrictions, nonprice restrictions have two
characteristics that justify the more sympathetic treatment they Ji'eceive
under the antitmst laws.
First, because nonprice restrictions stop both price and nonprice
competition, they can be used to overcome the free-rider problem. 87
Their imposition may therefore be explained by the dealer-seJrVices rationale, and they cannot be presumed to be anticompeHtive. Second,
35. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
86. l'he per se rule should not be applied, however, to restraints that are really territorial
restrictions, Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.),
cer/. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (extra-territorial sales permitted at above list prices), nor when
the price restraint is ancillary to beneficial integration. Bark, T!Je Rule ofReason, supra nole 23, a!
457-64.
87. l'he utility of nonprice restrictions in overcoming the free-rider problem is well established. Airtight territorial restrictions, which stop all intmbrand competition, see note 89 i1!{ra,
would, if successfully imposed at the dealer level, stop the kind of nonprice, free-rider effect thai
occurs when price-fixing is employed and would thus overcome the free-rider problem. Restrictions on dealer locations may also separate dealers enough to avoid the kind of free-rider effect
that diminishes important dealer sel!'Vices. Restrictions that permit a manufacturer to sell only to
outlets that meet sel!'Vice standards the manufacturer desires are even more lili:ely to facilitate
dealer services. See Williamson, Sllpra note 23, at 975-79. Indeed, when a manufacturer seeks to
ensure consumer services through contracts with his dealers, customer rest_rictions are necessary to
!J:eep
merchandise from those who refuse to agree to the contracts.

we
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nonprice restraints differ widely in their types and effects; some place
only minimal restraints on intrabrand competition. 88 For nonprice restraints, therefore, a court must base a finding of anticompetitive effect
on an appraisal of the circumstances in which the restraints are imposed.
The question arises, however, whether those nonprice restrictions
that foreclose all intrabrand competition-for example, airtight customer or territorial restrictions 89--can be presumed to be always anticompetitive. That presumption cannot be made. 90 Airtight
restrictions are often imposed on distributors, not on dealers. 91 As long
as intrabrand competition among dealers remains unfettered, a dealer's
incentive to stop carrying low-profit brands will force distributors to
reduce prices to dealers in order to compete for dealer outlets, just as
manufacturers do. 92 A restraint on a distributor's territory, without
more, will therefore not stop intrabrand competition among dealers
88. For example, area-of-primary-responsibility clauses and profit pass-over provisions, see
note 2 supra, may be administered so as to overcome free-riding intrabrand competition only,
without restraining socially useful forms of intrabiand competition. Similarly, the effect of location restrictions, see note 2 supra, on intrabrand competition will depend on how far apart dealers
are separated and on. the willingness of customers to travel to the dealers. For these nonprice
restraints, at least, a finding of anticompetitive effect must be based on an appraisal of the circumstances in which they are imposed. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 2, at 2025.
89. Restrictions are airtight when potential buyers of a brand have only one source to turn to.
Customer restrictions are airtight when only one of a manufacturer's dealers is permitted to trade
with each customer; territorial restrictions are airtight when the territorial boundaries are closed
and not overlapping; location restrictions are airtight when the dealers are separated by more
distance than consumers are able or willing to travel to shop for the merchandise.
90. But cf. Pitofsky, supra note 5 (arguing that a per se rule should be applicable because
airtight restrictions are likely to arise from dealer pressure, and because those that can be explained by the dealer-services rationale are likely to be unidentifiable and unimportant).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (airtight restrictions were imposed only on distributors; the customer and location restrictions on dealers apparently were not airtight), overruled in part, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(1977); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) (airtight territories on distributors are
lawful only under the rule of reason). But see White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963) (airtight restrictions on both dealers and distributors); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321
F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963) (dealers were assigned territories but were permitted to sell to customers
coming to them from outside the territory). See Note, supra note 56, at 803.
92. See text accompanying note 56 supra. On the other hand, there may be circumstances in
which a dealer is unable, as a matter of marketing realities, to stop selling low-profit brands, in
which event intrabrand competition between distributors may be important for dealers· and consumers. This may have been the case in In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978). For example,
a supermarket might carry a low-profit item of frequent purchase, like a particular brand of bread
or soft drink, because consumers would not shop there at all otherwise. Congress reversed the
Coca-Cola decision in legislation authorizing exclusive territories for bottlers if there is "substantial and effective interbrand competition." See Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3503 (West Supp. 1981).
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and should not be held per se unlav1ful. 93 1\lloreover, the deale:rs' bargaining power over distributors makes it unlikely that a per se mle can
be justified by a distributor-cartel theory. In order to deprive dealers of
choices, a distributor cartel wouldl have to include virtually all brands
and would thus be both rare, because it would be unstable, and easily
identifiable.
In sum, nonprice restraints should be analyzed under the mle of
.reason; section HI addresses how that analysis should proceed.

Hl

TRANSFOR..MJNG THEORY TO lPRACTICE: THE RULE OF REASON

Although it is too soon to discern whether a single, coherent ruleof-reason standard is being developed in the post-S;'IJ-'alzza cases, 94
many commentators 95 and most courts follow a structural approach:
they balance the defendant's market share, a surrogate measure of the
vigor of interbrand competition, against an evaluation of whether the
restraint promotes dealer services. 96 The lower the market share, the
easier it is to justify the restraint. This symmetry, however, is imperfect; courts appear to be :influenced by their own a priori evaluation of
the dealer-services rationale and allocate the burden of proof and the
burden of persuasion accordingly. Some easily accept the dealer-services argument and give it overriding weight, 97 while others-such as the
93. When airtight territorial restraints are imposed on dealers, the presumption that their
effect is anticompetitive becomes greater. Even so, however, the possibility of a legitimate freerider problem to be overcome by the restraints makes any a priori generalization about their competitive effect impossible.
94. Many of the post-Sylvama cases merely reversed and remanded decisions made under
the Sclnvinn per se rule. See, e.g., General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 568 F.2d 1147
(7th Cir. 1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, line., 561 F.2d 807 (lOth Cir. 1977);
Florida Harvestore, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 561 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1977).
See also National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1978)
(affirming a directed verdict against a plaintiff who had relied on the per se rule), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979); Lucas Hoist & Equip. Co. v. Eaton Corp., 76 F.R.D. 661 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. II 61,776, at 73,208 (1\l.D. Ill. 1977)
(vacating the final judgment).
95. See the co=entators cited in note 26 supra.
96. See, e.g., Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md.
1980), q!J'd 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981).
97. See, e.g., Cowley v. Braden Indus., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 446 U.S. 965
(!980). Two courts have granted summary judgment against plaintiffs challenging intrabrand restraints. See Golden Gate Acceptance Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1979) (location clause is lawful where the parties agreed io it and the manufacturer's intent was to
provide an effective sales and service network); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461
F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (on remand, the court held Sylvania's location clause pro-competitive).
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·Federal Trade Commission98-view the dealer-services argument as
suspect. 99 In any event, the rule-of-reason standard generally applied
gives the jury wide discretion to arrive at its own assessment of competitive effects. 100
The focus on market share is basically sound, but the competitiveadvantages rationale makes the analysis more accurate. Two preli.m.inary observations must be made. First, because theories explaining intrabrand restraints differ in their assumptions about a manufacturer's
motive for imposing restraints, one is tempted to measure the effect of a
restraint by asking why the manufacturer imposed it. Focusing on subjective motive, however, is risky and ineffectual: not only can evidence
of purpose be manipulated, but the evidence is usually ambiguous. A
sounder analysis would identify the most likely effect of the restraint by
focusing on objective evidence concerning the nature of intrabrand
competition, relying on evidence of subjective intent only to illuminate
the objective facts. 101 For example, a relevant question is whether a
significant free-rider problem really exists, not only whether the manufacturer believes one to exist.
Second, analyzing the effect of intrabrand restraints does not require the loss of intrabrand competition to be balanced against a gain
in interbrand competition. 102 Dealer services may increase the vigor of
interbrand competition by making a product more attractive, but that is
an incidental benefit: the real issue remains whether th~ loss of intrabrand competition itself injures or benefits potential consumers of
the brand in question. Those consumers are injured by the restraint if,
without obtaining more services, they are denied intrabrand choices
that are sources of consumer welfare, but are benefited if dealer services increase.
98. In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978); Beltone Elecs. Corp.; Administrative Law
Judge Decision, [1980]3 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) ~21,726.
99. See, e.g., Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (analyzing and
dismising the free-rider argument for failure of proof).
100. See First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 612 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 924 (1980); Reno-West Coast Distribution Co. v. Mead Corp., 613 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); Del Rio Distrib. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979).
101. "(G]ood intentions will [not] save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse;
but knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences." Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 u:s. 231,238 (1918).
102. The Supreme Court's contrary assumption impeded the growth of coherent antitrust doctrine. Balancing interbrand against intrabrand competition was rejected by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), but has since become acceptable. See
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.l9 (1977).
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fu theory, one could analyze the competitive effect of ~ntrabrand

restraints by identifying cases of genuine dealer cartels and holding
them unlawful, and looking at the remaining cases for changes in the
dealers' margins. J[f restraints increased those margins, the effects
would be presumptively pro-competitive: rational manufacturers
would not allow their dealers greater gross profits unless those profits
were used to increase dealer services. Xf restraints left dealers' margins
unaffected or decreased, the effects would be presumptively anticompetitive because intrabrand competition would have been restrained without the dealers' obtaining any extra money to spend on added services.
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itiated restraints is difficult, 103 and evaluating changes in dealers' margins is nearly impossible, 104 making that approach unworkable. 'Ihe
problem of distinguishing dealer cartels f:rom manufacturer-initiated
restraints can be avoided, however, by refining the current approach
that focuses on market share. Restraints imposed under the competitive-advantages rationale have the same adverse effects as those imposed under the dealer-cartel rationale; the two differ only with respect
to the level-dealer or manufacturer-at which excess profits are
earned. Because both are likely to occur only if the product in question
has enough market power 105 from differentiation to make the restraints
profitable, the two rationales can usefully be treated together. A workable approach would therefore examine the circumstances of the re~
straint to determine whether a manufacturer's market power or his
desire for additional dealer services is the more likely explanation for
the restraint. 106 U the former, the restraints should be unlawful; if the
latter, they should be lawful.
103. See note 38 supra.
I 04. Several of the essays in RESALE P!UCE MAJNTENANCE, supra note 33, su=arize studies
attempting to assess the effect of resale price maintenance on dealer margin and refer to the measurement problems. /d. at 55, 99-100. See also Schmalensee, Ont!Je Use o/ Economic Jofodels in
Antitrust: Tile ReaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994, 1007-08 (1979) (noting the difficulty of
measuring and evaluating changes in profitability).
105. In this context, the term "market power" is synonymous with the term "competitive advantages": both denote a situation in which one brand is more attractive or less costly to produce
than rival brands, giving that brand's manufacturer at least a short-run opportunity to earn morethan-competitive profits.
106. The applicability of either the competitive-advantages or the dealer-cartel rationale depends also on the degree to which intrabrand competition is eliminated by the restraint. Airtight
territorial and customer restrictions, see.note 89 supra, eliminate all intrabrand competition. Location restrictions should be presumed to be airtight when they" separate dealers by more than the
average distance consumers are willing to shop for goods; location restrictions separating dealers
by a lesser distance should be evaluated to see whether some significant class of consumers shops
between the dealers in a way that constrains the dealers' behavior. Area-of-primary-responsibility
clauses, see note 88 supra, are neutral unless admii:J.istered in a way that restricts sales outside the
areas. See, e.g., Reed Bros. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975) (enforcement of shipping policies and rebate agreements make it economically ;mpossib!e to sell outside an area of
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Market Power.

Elasticity of demand directly measures differentiation, and hence
market power, 107 but elasticity defies accurate measurement 108 and
therefore fails as an analytical tool. Another measure of market power
is a comparison of a product's marginal cost with its selling price; a
price substantially and persistently above marginal cost suggests a high
degree of market power. But marginal costs are also difficult to determine, 10 9 so this method, too, fails the test of practicality.
Antitrust cases have evolved the concept of "relevant" market to
assess market power. 110 Although "market share in a relevant market"
and "market power" are not synonymous, 111 in practice the reievant
market concept can reasonably, if roughly, measure market power in
primary responsibility), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976); Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland,
Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.) (area-of-primary responsibility clauses enforced by "silent understanding" and "course of dealing"), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973). q. Response of Carolina,
Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. ~ 61,045 (5th Cir. 1976) (territorial confinement
may be inferred from higher royalty payments on sales outside area of primary responsibility);
Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers, 533 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1975) (territorial confinement may be
inferred from assigned areas and resulting conduct). Profit p·ass-over provisions, see note 88
supra, unduly restrict intrabrand competition to the extent that they more than compensate for the
goodwill used by the dealer entering the protected territory. See, e.g., Superior Bedding Co. v.
Serta Assocs., 353 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-51 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
107. Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 939-43.
108. Schmalensee, supra note 104, at 1007, described the difficulties in the context of the
FTC's ReaLemon decision (In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978)):
If prices have not varied enough, historical data may not contain information from
which reliable estimates of [elasticity] can be derived; and in most situations this elasticity may vary with both the level of price charged and the length of time over which buyer
response to price changes is measured . . . . [Elasticity], as defined in the textbooks,
measures the sensitivity of demand for a firm's product to changes in the firm's own
price, assuming that all other prices in the economy remain constant. Changes in
ReaLemon's pnce, however, might have induced changes in the prices of other brands of
processed .lemon juice, and perhaps even in the price of fresh lemons. If th,ese prices
affected the demand for ReaLemon's output, the price elasticity of demand relevant to
ReaLemon's decisionmaking must have reflected its expectations about the changes in
competitors' prices that ReaLemon's actions would provoke and its assumptions about
the effect of those changes on the demand for ReaLemon's product. Expectations of this
cost may be a major determinant of the markup over marginal cost actually selected, but
they cannot be readily measured by an outside observer.
109. See Schmalensee, supra note 104, at 1006. See also Posner, 0/igopolistic Pricing Suits,
supra note 60, at 910.
I 10. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (holding a merger violative of the Clayton Act); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (a
monopoly case under the Sherman Act).
Ill. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., I 10 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
(the court gave some, but not conclusive, weight to the market share), affd per curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954). The problems of market definition are helpfully discussed in Schmalensee, supra note
104, at 1004-16. Of the many other general discussions of market definition seeR.- PosNER, supra
note 35, at 125-34; F. ScHERER, supra note 51, at 59-61.
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monopolization and merger cases, where market power is of concem
only if it is substantial. lin measuring the significance of intrabrand
competition, however, the relevant market concept i.s much less satisfactory because it does not identify firms or products that have market
power of less than substantial proportions. To the extent that the market definition includes products that are not dose substitutes, it underestimates the market power of individual manufacturers in that market
and thus fails to disclose market power derived from product differentiation.112
To determine whether a merger between the Coca-Cola Company
and another soft drin lc company is lawful, for example, the "soft drink"
market may be an appropriate relevant market. 113 H may not, however, make sense to include all soft drinks in the relevant market if the
issue is whether the loss of :intrabrand competition alllong Coca-Cola
bottlers is significant for consumers. Kf consumers do not consider the
cola altemati.ves to Coca-Cola to be good substitutes, intrabrand competition among Coca-Cola bottlers may be more significant than interbrand competition in keeping prices low. 114
!n short, a correct evaluation of 1ntrabrand restrictions requires
that the relevant product market be defined narrowly. One must determine whether a firm-because of product differentiation or some other
advantage over its rivals-has a degree of discretionary power that
makes consumer choice between outlets selling that firm's product an
important source of consumer welfare. I 15 The factors that go into this
analysis will be the same as those used for traditional market definition, 116 because the underlying question-the existence of market
112. In most monopoly and merger cases, the efficiencies of firm size and integration mean
that is is only worthwhile to attack substantial disparities between price and cost, so that relatively
broad market definitions may be acceptable. Compare United States v. E. 1 duPont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (market defined broadly in a monopolization case) with United States
v. E. L duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (!957) (minimal integration may have justified
the Court's narrow product market definition). By contrast, restrictions on intra brand competition
that produce no efficiencies are worth attacking even when they result in relatively less disparity
between price and cost.
113. See, e.g., FTC v. Pepsi Co., 477 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1973).
i 14. This appears to have been the approach taken by the Federal Trade Commission in In re
Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), in which, without defining a relevant market, the Commission found that although Coca-Cola is "not devoid of interbrand competition, nevertheless CocaCola and allied product prices have great competitive significance in the marketplace." I d. at 619.
See also Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
115. See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 857 (6th Cir. 1964) ("significant product
differentiation increases somewhat the importance of intrabrand competition between distributors
and increases correspondingly the required justification for abolishing it").
116. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (listing "industry or
public recognition, . . . the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors" (foot-
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power-remains the same. But the issue should be whether other products are close, almost perfect, substitutes for the product on which intrabrand restrictions have been imposed.
Market power may derive from a manufacturer's cost advantage,
as well as from his product's differentiation. Thus costs should be an
element in the market-power analysis. Furthermore, analysis of the
relevant market for a brand may be deceptive if a second brand looks
like a good substitute for the first only because the price of the first has
risen so far above its cost that consumers are induced to switch
brands. 117 Costs should be examilled for this reason as well.
B. Dealer Services.

Mter determining that either the competitive-advantages theory or
the dealer-cartel theory explains a restraint, one must weigh that determination against the possibility that the restraint increased dealer services. Because it is difiicuh to determine directly that intrabrand
restraints have increased dealer services, the best technique is· to determine whether the circumstances that make the dealer-services explanation a valid one are present in a particular case. In the context of
nonprice restraints, dealer-service arguments usually fall into four categories-the need to overcome a free-rider problem, to obtain market
penetration, to encourage dealer investment, and to ensure product
quality and safety. The circumstances that make each of these arguments sound or unsound are examined separately.
1. Free riding. The free-rider problem exists only when a dealer
provides services with respect to a particular product, 118 the services
potentially benefit rival dealers, 119 and other dealers have the incentive
and ability to profit from the first dealer's provision of services. If these
conditions do not exist, free riding is not a problem and manufacturers
should not argue that it is.
note omitted)). A court might also determine the existence of product differentiation by
determining whether a brand's share of the relevant market changes when relative prices within
the market change. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 217 (1959).
117. R. PosNER, supra note 23, at 128; Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New
Competition, 45 AM. EcoN. REv. 29, 57-63 (1955); Turner, Anlilrosl Policy and the Cellophane
Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281, 309 (1956).
118. When the activity promotes a particular dealer-rather than a particular product-other
dealers will be unable to take a free ride on the activity and there will thus be no disincentive to
engage in it. Telser, supra note 23, at 89. Dealer advertising may, of course, be related to both the
dealer and the product, in which event some free riding may be possible.
119. See Posner, supra note 16, at 6. See note 42.supra.
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Free riding is not a problem, fo:r example, when a dealer confines
h1s services, such as maintenance and repair, to those customers who
buy from that dealer. Nor does it exist when dealers do not provide
any customer services, nor when a manufacturer undertakes most or all
of the activities that satisfy or generate consumer demand, nor when
the manufacturer ensures through contract that all his dealers will supply the necessary services. Moreover, dealers have a natural incentive,
regardless of the possibility of free riding, to cultivate a high quality
image for themselves; this is especially true for dealers in multiple
brands, where the amount of services provided for any particular brand
is unlikely to be determined by the size of the dealer margin on that
product. Finally, consumers may be unresponsive to the free-rider possibility when the cost or time required to identify and patronize freeriding dealers is high.12o
2. JYarket penetration. One of the common arguments supporting territorial restrictions holds that they increase market penetration.121 A dealer or distributor may find that the profitability of serving
various types of customers, or customers in different localities, varies
because his costs of serving the customers vary. If he can spread his
costs over all customers in a given area, he can afford to serve otherwise
unprofitable, high-cost buyers. In effect, low-cost customers subsidize
high-cost customers by paying for a disproportionate share of the
jointly incurred costs of distribution. If intrabrand competition were
permitted, however, some of the relatively more lucrative customers
might shift to other dealers or distributors; the possibility of spreading
distribution costs over a large number of outlets would decrease; and
each distributor or dealer would sell to fewer customers.
Although this justification is both difficult to evaluate theoretically122 and difficult to discount when raised 1n a particular case, it ap120. The cost of a product includes search costs, which encompass the cost of information
about the product and the cost of time and transportation required to obtain the product. Stigler,
1l1e Economics o.f Information, 69 J. PoLITICAL EcoN. 213 (1961).
121. PitofslJ', supra· note 5, at 13, indicates that this may be what the Supreme Court had in
mind in Sj•h•ania when it said that vertical nonprice restraints allow the manufacturer to attract
dealers who will make "the kind of investment in capital and labor that is often required in the
distribution of products unknown to consumers." 433 U.S. at 55. The classic statement of the
market-penetration argument was made in Preston, supra note 23, at 511. See also Warren, Economics o.fC/osed Territory .Distribution, 2 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REv. Ill (1968).
122. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 22, at 1431:
What is important is not whether these restrictions enhance market coverage or customer
contact, for this they may well do, but rather whether restrictions of this character are
lilcely to improve the competitive process throuph which resources are allocated to these
activities. While society generally approves of rmproved market coverage, it also generally deplores higher dealer markups and higher costs of distribution. Whether the addi-

Vol. 1981:417]

COMPETITIVE ADT'liNTAGES

445

pears to be applicable only under several limiting conditions, namely
that (1) the cost of selling .to customers varies widely; (2) the cost of
selling to some of the customers is so high that no sales could be made
unless the cost could be shared among all customers; and (3) any invading dealer or distributor selling to low-cost customers would have no
incentive to pick up additional sales by also selling to high-cost customers. Where these conditions are not met, it is unlikely that territorial
restrictions can be used to increase market penetration.
3. Increasing investment. As a corollary to the dealer-services
theorj, it is sometime argued that 1ntrabrand restrictions are justified
because by reducing risk they increase capital investment by dealers; a
manufacturer may in effect guarantee his dealers' investment in fixed
and unmarketable assets by reducing the risks of loss from intrabrand
competition. 123 Although the premise of this argument is true--decreasing risks will increase investment-the argument should be accepted only if the risks are created by a free-rider problem.
The general argument that the risks flowing from competition
should be reduced in order to increase investment is, of course, antithetical to the notion of a competitive market. Absent a market failure
like the free-rider problem, the proper amount of investment is that
which reflects competitive risks and consumers' willingness to compensate for those risks. Inducing a greater amount of investment misallocates resources by drawing more resources into an industry than
consumers desire. Thus, antitrust doctrine has never generally accepted the argument that private restrictions on competition can be justified as necessary to provide more investment, or, for that matter, more
research or more technology, than the market provides. 124
Nonetheless, the dealer-investment argument has validity in narrow circumstances. A dealer who agrees with the manufacturer to intiona! gains are worth the additional costs is, of course, the essence of the problem of
resource allocation-a problem whose solution we normally leave to the marketplace.
I d. (citations omitted). See also Hearings on S. 2549 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1088 (1966) (statement of Donald F.
Turner, then-Professor, Harvard School of Law). The market-penetration argument nonetheless
has a strong free-rider aspectthat should be considered: sales to less profitable accounts may have
a promotional effect that benefits the invading dealer even though the invading dealer need not
incur the cost of selling to those accounts.
123. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (''new
manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce
competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is
often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer").
124. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass.
1953), qff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See also Comanor, supra note 22, at 1428-29; Louis,
Vertical .Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania, supra note 10, at 296.
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vest ln fixed and unmarketable assets may want to protect that
investment by ensuring that the manufacturer does not later undercut
the bargain by himself competing with, or appointing a new dealer to
compete with, the contracting dealer. 125 The manufacturer assumes, in
this respect, the same position as the seller of a business who transfers
the good will of the business to the buyer-they are both possible freeriders because they both have the possibility of profiting from an exchange while denying the fruits of that exchange to the other party. 126
This consideration, however, justifies only restrictions on the manufacturer's freedom. The manufacturer's promise is reasonably necessary to ensure that he cannot appoint a dealer, have the dealer develop
the territory, and then render the dealership valueless by himself competing, or by appointing a new dealer, in that territory. The same considerations hardly justify a manufaCturer in protecting an appointed
dealer from competition with pre-existing dealers, because the appointed dealer takes his dealership subject to the risks of competition.
Unless the restriction keeps the manufacturer from purposefully undercutting the good will the dealer develops, the restriction i.s unnecessary
to 1ndnce the proper amount of dealer in'v'estment and should therefore
be unlawful.
4. Qualii)J and sqfery. Even under the Schwinn per se rule courts
accepted the argument that intrabrand restrictions might be necessary
to maintain product qualit)' or to promote safety; 127 doubtless, after
Sylvania the courts will continue to do so. "When a product can be
safely used only by professionals, a manufacturer should be allowed to
restrict distribution to professionals. 'When product quality diminishes
with shipping time, a manufacturer should be allowed to restrict the
shipping distance of the product
The quality or safety argument sometimes includes, however, the
assertion that intrabrand competition would take away the profits that
dealers need in order to foster quality. lin defending its territorial re125. See Hearings on S. 598 .Bifore the Subcomm. on Antitmst, Monopoly and .Business Rights
qf the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-43 (1979) (statement of Victor P.
Goldberg, Professor; of Economics, University of California at Davis).
126. See Natiorlal Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Mitchell
v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (ch. 1711).
127. See Cooper Liquor v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976); Tripoli Co. v.
Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.) (upholding a restriction to professional use only), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 831 (1970); Mitchell v. United States Surgical Corp., 1976-1 Trade Cas. ~ 60,879 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (upholding territorial restrictions said to ensure pro~pt service); Sulmeyer v. SevenUp Co., 411 F. Supp. 635, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d
1178 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). lin Sylvania, the Court expressly recognized the validity of cases like Tripoli. 433 U.S. at 55 n.23.
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straints on _bottlers, for example, the Coca-Cola Company argued that
its restrictions increased market penetration and thereby permitted bottlers to ensure the proper inventory turnover at each store. 128 Without
the territorial restriction, the company argued, market penetration
would have been diminished, some chain stores would have taken delivery at central warehouses, and bottlers could no longer have ensured
that their inventory was properly turned over. To the contrary, however, because the market normally induces all dealers to maintain their
product quality and thus ensure repeat purchases, such arguments
should be accepted with caution; they should be successful only when
the possible anticompetitive effect of the restraint is minimal, when the
need for dealer services or market penetration is a likely explanation, 129
and when quality cannot be maintained by contractual obligations.
IV.

CoNCLUSION

The failure of antitrust law to provide a workable, coherent, and
settled doctrine applicable to intrabrand restrictions reflects inadequate
understanding of the economics of the subject. Economic analysis usually assumes that intrabrand restraints directly increase manufacturers'
profits only when imposed by a manufacturers' cartel and assumes that
otherwise they increase dealer margins, either in response to a dealer
cartel or in an attempt to increase dealer services. Although each of
these explanations is valid under some circumstances, they each miss
an important alternative explanation: the competitive-advantages theory. That theory states that a manufacturer profits directly from intrabrand restrictions when they enable him to keep his price to dealers
higher than would otherwise be possible. With active intrabrand competition, the dealers' profitability on a particular brand decreases and ·
the manufacturer can be forced to lower his wholesale price to compensate for his brand's lower profitability iri the retail market. Without
active intrabrand competition, the manufacturer can maintam higher
wholesale prices. Restraints imposed under the competitive-advantages rationale decrease consumer welfare and are unjustifiable.
The competitive-advantages rationale helps make antitrust doctrine coherent by showing that the Supreme Court in Sylvania correctly
128. See, e.g., In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978). The Federal Trade Commission
rejected the argument, finding that to achieve its quality-control objectives, the Coca-Cola Company could "establish reasonable quality control standards for distribution and storage, including
inventory rotation policies, and may further require that each bottler identifY itself on the bottle,
bottle cap, or on the can so that [Cola-Cola] may reasonably monitor compliance with its quality
standards." Id. at 634.
129. See text accompanying notes ll8-22 supra.
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distinguished resale price maintenance from nonprice intrabrand restrainis. The dealer-services theory never explains resale price maintenance, because resale price maintenance does not solve the free-rider
problem and therefore cannot induce desirable services. Resale price
maintenance can be explained only by the competitive-advantages rationale, or by a cartel rationale, so that the per se rule prohibiting resale
price maintenance is fully justified.
By contrast, nonprice restraints may overcome a free-rider problem with little anticompetitive effect; they may be explained either by
the dealer-services or the competitive-advantages rationale. Courts
should therefore analyze nonprice restraints under the rule of reason to
determine which rationale better explains the case at hand.

